This paper integrates e¢ ciency wage setting in the theory of optimal redistributive income taxation. In doing so, we use a model with two skill-types, where e¢ ciency wage setting characterizes the labor market faced by the low-skilled, whereas the highskilled face a conventional, competitive labor market. There are two types of jobs in this economy; a low-demanding job which can be carried out by everybody, and a high-demanding job which can only be carried out by the high-skilled, meaning that a potential mimicker may either adopt a conventional income-replication strategy or a job-replication strategy. In this framework, we show that the marginal income tax implemented for the high-skilled is negative under plausible assumptions. The marginal income tax facing the low-skilled can be either positive or negative in general, even if employment-related motives for policy intervention typically contribute to an increase in this marginal tax. An increase in the unemployment bene…t contributes to relax the binding self-selection constraint (irrespective of the strategy adopted by a potential mimicker), which makes this instrument particularly useful from the perspective of redistribution.
Introduction
The modern theory of optimal redistributive taxation, as developed from the seminal contribution of Mirrlees (1971) , is largely based on model economies where the labor market is competitive. Although analytically convenient, such a description of the labor market is clearly at odds with most real world developed economies, where unemployment has been an important social problem for a long time. Albeit small by comparison, a literature on optimal redistributive taxation under unemployment has gradually evolved during the latest decades, in which the incentives underlying an optimal tax policy partly di¤er from those following under perfect competition. The major mechanisms generating unemployment in these studies are trade-union wage formation (e.g., (Marceau and Boadway, 1994) , and search frictions (Lehmann et al., 2015) . Although fundamentally di¤erent, a common denominator is a policy incentive to reduce the level of unemployment, which is likely to result in higher marginal income tax rates than under perfect competition.
However, to our knowledge, there are no earlier studies on optimal redistributive taxation in economies where the labor market is characterized by e¢ ciency wages. The overall purpose of the present paper is to …ll this gap by integrating e¢ ciency wages in the self-selection approach to optimal taxation. Such an extension is interesting for several reasons. First, e¢ ciency wage theory has played an important role in labor economics for a long time by explaining involuntary unemployment as well as wage di¤erentials across workers and sectors. 1 Second, it has been used in related areas of public economics as a framework for studying relationships between tax policy, wages, and unemployment in representative-agent models (e.g., Chang, 1995; Pisauro, 1995) .
Third, and compared to the related literature on trade-union behavior, e¢ ciency wage theory does not rely on any (arbitrary) assumption of objective function for trade- 1 See Katz (1986) for an overview of e¢ ciency wage models. See also Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) .
unions, 2 since the wage rate is decided on unilaterally by …rms realizing that increased wages leads to higher productivity.
Our study is based on a two-type model, 3 where e¢ ciency wage setting characterizes the labor market faced by the low-skilled type, whereas the high-skilled type faces a conventional, competitive labor market. The rationale for this assumption is that the unemployment is typically higher and more persistent among the low-skilled than among the high-skilled, suggesting that mechanisms generating equilibrium unemployment are more important to examine in the context of agents with relatively low productivity.
The government in our model uses a nonlinear income tax and an unemployment bene…t to correct for the imperfection in the labor market and redistribute income from the high-skilled to the low-skilled. We assume that two types of jobs are available in the economy; a low-demanding job which can be carried out both by the low-skilled and high-skilled individuals, and a high-demanding job which can only be carried out by the high-skilled. We also assume that e¤ort -which is thought of as the "e¤ort exerted per hour spent at the workplace" -is a decision-variable in the low-demanding job, meaning that individuals employed in this type of job have the option to "shirk" with an exogenous probability of detection (through imperfect monitoring). 4 As a consequence, there are two ways for a high-skilled individual to mimic the income of the low-skilled type; either by choosing a low-demanding job, or by reducing the hours of work when employed in a high-demanding job. In turn, the government must recognize both these options when solving the optimal tax and expenditure problem. 2 See Kaufmann (2001) for an overview of models with trade-unionized labor markets. 3 The discrete two-type version of the Mirrleesian optimal income tax problem was developed in its original form by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982) . 4 Notice that imperfect monitoring in the low-demanding job generates a second source of asymmetric information, between …rms and workers employed in the low-demanding job, on top of the standard asymmetric information problem between the government and the workers (regarding their skill type). In this sense our paper also relates to a recent strand in the Mirrleesian literature (see Stantcheva, 2014 , Bastani et al., 2015 and Cremer and Roeder, 2017 analyzing optimal tax policy in settings with two sources of asymmetric information. The di¤erence is that, whereas in the aforementioned papers the second source of asymmetric information manifested itself in an adverse selection problem, in our model it manifests itself in a moral hazard problem.
The outline of the study is as follows. In Section 2, we present the model by going through, in turn, the decision-problem and behavior of individual consumers and …rms, respectively, and the optimal tax and expenditure problem facing the government. The optimal tax and expenditure policy is characterized and discussed in Section 3, while the conclusions are summarized in Section 4. Some of the derivations and proofs are given in the Appendix.
The Model
The economy is populated by two skill-types. High-skilled workers are paid the beforetax wage rate w h , and low-skilled workers are paid the before-tax wage rate w`, where w h > w`. The total population is normalized to one and the fraction of individuals of type j is denoted by j (for j =`; h).
One single output good is produced by identical …rms using labor as the only input, and the production process is characterized by constant returns to scale. Since the number of …rms is treated as exogenous, it will be normalized to one for notational convenience. As we mentioned above, there are two di¤erent jobs available in the economy. One is low-demanding and can be carried out by all workers (low-skilled as well as high-skilled), while the other is high-demanding and exclusive to high-skilled workers.
Whereas the second job pays a competitive wage, the …rst job is characterized by a monitoring technology such that the employers pay a wage above the market clearing level in order to boost the e¤ort level of the employees. This generates involuntary unemployment among the low-skilled.
Individuals and Firms
Individual preferences are represented by the strictly quasi-concave utility function
where c denotes consumption, L denotes the hours spent at the workplace, and e 2 [0; 1]
denotes the e¤ort the individual exerts at the workplace. Individuals derive utility from consumption and disutility from work hours and e¤ort, respectively, i.e., @v=@c > 0, @v=@L < 0, and @v=@e < 0. To simplify the interpretation of the results, we also add the (quite realistic) assumption that @ 2 v=@e@L < 0, i.e., the marginal utility of leisure ( @v=@L) increases with the e¤ort exerted when working.
For a worker employed in the high-demanding job, where there is no monitoring problem and competitive wages are paid, we assume that the e¤ort exerted by workers is equal to one, which can be interpreted to mean that workers in the high-demanding job never shirk. 5 However, for workers employed in the low-demanding job, e¤ort is a choice variable and a¤ects the probability of being …red. The probability of being monitored in the low-demanding job is assumed to be exogenous, and a worker is …red if caught shirking. 6 Assuming that the …rms monitor each worker in the low-demanding job with probability, p, and interpreting 1 e as the fraction of time that an individual spends shirking while on the job, the probability of being …red is given by (1 e) p ' (e),
where @' (e) =@e < 0. If …red, a low-skilled worker faces two alternatives: he/she can either be hired by another …rm or become unemployed. 7 The economy-wide unemployment rate is denoted by u.
In the tradition of the optimal income tax literature à la Mirrlees (1971) , we assume that an individual's skill-type (as re ‡ected in the before-tax wage rate) is private information, while the individual's income if employed, I j = w j L j , is publicly observable.
This rules out …rst-best type-speci…c lump-sum taxes but allows income to be taxed via 5 This is clearly a simpli…cation; albeit a consequence of the assumption of a perfectly competitive market for this type of job. A possible interpretation is that the job characteristics make shirking impossible or uninteresting for those employed in the high-demanding job. 6 Assuming away turnover costs, this turns out to be the best strategy for a …rm. 7 With all …rms in the economy being identical and under the assumption that agents are fully informed, the unitary wage of a low-skilled worker, as well as his/her choice of e¤ort, will be the same in each …rm. a general, nonlinear tax schedule, T I j . The other policy instrument at the disposal of the government is a transfer, b, paid to each unemployed individual. To characterize the set of (constrained) Pareto-e¢ cient resource allocations, we will derive an optimal revelation mechanism. For our purpose, a mechanism consists of a set of type-speci…c before-tax incomes, I j 's, and disposable incomes, B j 's, for individuals in employment, an unemployment bene…t, b, and an unemployment rate, u, which we will include as an arti…cial control variable in the social decision-problem. A complete solution to the optimal tax problem per se, such that I j and B j are determined via individual utility maximization, then requires the design of a general income tax function, T ( ), such that B j = I j T I j . This will be described in greater detail below.
We begin by characterizing the decision-problems and behavior of individuals and …rms, respectively, and then continue with the optimal tax and expenditure problem.
An individual of any type j treats the hourly wage rates, the unemployment bene…t, the unemployment rate, and the parameters of the tax function (including the structure of marginal taxation) as exogenous. Private consumption equals the disposable income B j for an employed individual of skill-type j =`; h, and equals b for an unemployed individual.
Starting with an individual of the low-skilled type, note that this individual makes two decisions; (i) an optimal e¤ort choice (which in ‡uences the likelihood of becoming unemployed) and (ii) a consumption-leisure choice conditional on being employed. For a given (I`; B`)-bundle, we can de…ne the indirect expected utility function of a low-skilled individual as follows:
EV` B`; I`; u; b; w` = max
where we have used L`= I`=w`, and E denotes the expectations operator. The variable u'(e`) is interpretable as the probability of being unemployed (the overall unemployment rate among the low-skilled times the probability of being …red when shirking).
The …rst order condition for this problem is given by
Therefore, when choosing e¤ort level, this individual trades o¤ the additional cost of e¤ort against the gain in expected utility due to the decreased probability of becoming unemployed. Equation (2) implicitly de…nes the e¤ort level, e`, as a function of B`, I`=w`, b, and u, i.e., e`= e` B`; I`=w`; b; u :
Based on equation (2), we can derive the following comparative statics properties of the e¤ort function with respect to B`, I`, u, b, and w`:
where
These results are intuitive: an increase in the economy-wide unemployment rate increases the e¤ort, in order to reduce the probability of ending up in unemployment, while an increase in the unemployment bene…t leads to decreased e¤ort as it reduces the income loss to the individual if becoming unemployed. The e¤ect of an increase in the post-tax income in the employment state, B`, is ambiguous in general, since sign @ 2 v=@e`@B` is ambiguous. A su¢ cient (albeit not necessary) condition for @e`=@B`> 0 is that @ 2 v= @e`@B` 0, i.e., the marginal disutility of e¤ort is a weakly decreasing function of the disposable income in the employment state. The latter condition is obviously satis…ed in the special case where the utility function, as represented by equation (1), is separable between consumption and other goods (in which @ 2 v= @e`@B` = 0). Now, by noticing that an employed, low-skilled worker will behave as if he/she is maximizing EV` I` T I` ; I`; u; b; w` ; with respect to I`, we can implicitly characterize the marginal income tax rate faced by a low-skilled worker as follows based on the …rst order condition:
Similarly, a high-skilled individual is maximizing V h I h T I h ; I h ; w h = v(I h T (I h ); I h =w h ; e = 1) with respect to I h , and we can implicitly characterize the marginal income tax rate facing a high-skilled individual as
Turning to …rm behavior, let N`and N h denote the number of workers employed in the low-demanding and high-demanding job, respectively. The (linearly homogeneous) production function is given by
In writing (11), we have used the assumption that e h = 1. The production function is increasing in each argument,
0, the marginal products are diminishing such that F 00 11 @ 2 F=@(e`L`N`) 2 < 0 and 
Conditional on the choices made by the government, and by recognizing that the wage rate paid to workers in the lowdemanding job a¤ects their e¤ort choice through equation (3), the representative …rm chooses w`and N`. For a given bundle (I`,B`) intended by the government for lowskilled individuals, the …rst order conditions of a pro…t-maximizing …rm imply
Equation (12) implicitly characterizes the optimal wage rate paid to workers employed in the low-demanding job, and equation (13) implicitly characterizes the optimal number of agents employed in the low-demanding job. 8 With the disposable income in the employment state, B`, held constant, the wage rate enters the e¤ort equation only through I`=w`= L`. Therefore, equation (12) is just a variant of the standard condition for wage setting in an e¢ ciency wage model, i.e., (@e`=@w`)w`=e`= 1. Finally, the equilibrium wage rate for workers in the high-demanding job, w h , satis…es the condition
For later purposes, we need to evaluate how N`, w`and w h vary in response to changes in I`, B`, I h , B h , u, and b. Denoting the elasticity of substitution between the two labor inputs in production by , we have derived the following comparative statics results in the Appendix A:
Whereas some of the comparative statics derivatives are signed, others are not without additional assumptions. In particular, note that the elasticity of substitution, , plays a key role for how N`responds to variations in I`, B`, u, and b. Some of these results will be discussed in greater detail below, where (15)- (19) are used to characterize the optimal marginal tax and expenditure policy.
Social Decision-Problem
We consider the general governmental objective of reaching a Pareto e¢ cient resource allocation. This is accomplished by maximizing the (expected) utility of the low-skilled type subject to a minimum utility restriction for the high-skilled type, as well as subject to the appropriate self-selection and resource constraints. We also assume that the government (or social planner) wants to redistribute from the high-skilled to the lowskilled, which Stiglitz (1982) refers to as the "normal" case, meaning that the optimal resource allocation must be constrained to prevent high-skilled individuals from mimicking the low-skilled type. As such, the optimal marginal tax and expenditure policies characterized below will satisfy any social welfare function, which is increasing in the utility of both skill-types, if consistent with the assumed pro…le of the redistribution.
To ensure that each high-skilled individual prefers the allocation intended for his/her type (I h , B h ) over the before-tax and disposable income combination intended for the employed low-skilled type (I`, B`), we impose self-selection constraints designed to make mimicking unattractive. In our setting, mimicking can occur in two alternative ways.
One possibility would be for the high-skilled individual to reduce his/her labor supply in the high-demanding job to the extent required to earn I`instead of I h . Since the highskilled are more productive than the low-skilled, a high-skilled mimicker can reach the income level I`by supplying fewer hours of work than needed by a low-skilled individual.
Another possibility for a high-skilled individual to act as a mimicker would be to take a low-demanding job, which also gives the before-tax income I`. With regards to the latter option, we assume that, for any given level of e¤ort exerted in the workplace, the productivity of a high-skilled worker does not di¤er from the productivity of a low-skilled worker in the low-demanding job. A high-skilled individual working in the low-demanding job will thus be paid the wage rate w`(instead of the wage rate w h ).
If choosing a low-demanding job, the e¤ort exerted by a high-skilled individual will depend on the outside option if caught shirking and …red. Assuming that, if …red from a low-demanding job, a high-skilled individual can always …nd employment in a highdemanding job (so that he/she does not face any threat of becoming unemployed), the optimal e¤ort choice of a mimicker in a low-demanding job would be zero. Note that the utility of a mimicker would, in this case, exceed the utility faced by the low-skilled type, since the e¤ort provided by a high-skilled individual in the low-demanding job falls short of the e¤ort chosen by individuals of the low-skilled type.
Even though both available mimicking strategies require a high-skilled mimicker to earn the same before-tax income as a low-skilled individual, we will hereafter use the term income-replication strategy to refer to the case when a high-skilled individual behaves as a mimicker and chooses the high-demanding job (working fewer hours than a low-skilled individual), whereas we will use the expression job-replication strategy to refer to the case when a high-skilled individual behaves as a mimicker and chooses the low-demanding job (exerting less e¤ort than a low-skilled individual).
Now, since the government can implement any desired combination of work hours and disposable income for each skill-type subject to constraints, we follow convention in much earlier literature on optimal nonlinear taxation by writing the social decisionproblem directly in terms of the before-tax and disposable incomes, instead of in terms of parameters of the tax function. The social-decision problem can then be written as follows: subject to
where the Lagrange multipliers attached to the respective constraints are given in parentheses.
The -constraint is the minimum utility constraint, implying that the utility of each high-skilled individual must not fall short of V h . The -constraint and the -constraint are two self-selection constraints that jointly ensure that a high-skilled individual has no incentive to act as a mimicker, i.e., has no incentive to earn the income level intended for the low-skilled type through the income-replication or job-replication strategy, respectively. Note also that, unless the two mimicking strategies available to the high-skilled are equally attractive in utility terms, at most one of these two self-selection constraints will be binding. The -constraint is the economy-wide resource constraint, while the -constraint is required to treat the unemployment rate as an arti…cial control variable for the government. We can interpret the resource constraint such that the aggregate output must not fall short of the aggregate consumption.
The …rst order condition of the social decision-problem are presented in Appendix B. Next, we turn to the implications of these …rst order conditions for the optimal tax and expenditure policy.
Optimal Tax and Expenditure Policy
To simplify the presentation, we introduce the following short notation for marginal rates of substitution between the before-tax income and disposable income for a lowskilled individual and a mimicker, respectively, where we have distinguished between the income-replication and job-replication strategies for the mimicker:
For notational convenience, we also de…ne "utility compensated" wage and employment responses to an increase in the before-tax income, I`, such that
Equations (25) and (26) measure how an increase in the before-tax income, I`, a¤ects the wage rate, w`, and the number of employed persons, N`, respectively, of the lowskilled type, when the low-skilled are compensated via an increase in the disposable income, B`, to remain at the initial (expected) utility level. Similarly, equation (27) shows how a marginal increase in I`, compensated via a change in B`to leave the (expected) utility of low-skilled individuals unchanged, a¤ects the wage rate paid to workers in the high-demanding job, w h .
We are now ready to characterize the marginal income tax rates implemented for the two skill-types.
Proposition 1. The marginal income tax rate faced by high-skilled workers is negative (positive) if I` B`+ b `+ = > 0 (< 0) and given as follows:
Let e N`;I`a nd e w h ;I`d enote the compensated elasticity of N`and w h , respectively, respect to I`, such that e N`;I`= dÑd I`IǸ`a nd e w h ;I`= d e w h dI`Iẁ h . The marginal income tax rate faced by low-skilled workers can then be written as
Proof: see the Appendix C.
According to equation (28), high-skilled individuals should face a negative marginal income tax rate under realistic assumptions, implying that their labor supply is distorted upwards. This …nding is reminiscent of a result derived by Stiglitz (1982) in a model with competitive labor markets, where a negative marginal income tax rate for highskilled individuals works as a device to reduce the wage gap between the skill-types. 9 In our setting, a negative marginal income tax rate for the high-skilled is justi…ed as a mechanism through which the government may stimulate the demand for lowskilled labor. This is, in turn, socially bene…cial for two reasons: by (i) increasing the net revenue collected by the government (provided that the transfer paid to the unemployed is larger than the transfer paid to low-skilled workers), and (ii) reducing the unemployment rate, which is socially desirable whenever the social value of decreased unemployment measured in terms of public funds, = , is positive (see Proposition 2 below).
Turning to marginal income taxation of the low-skilled in equation (29), the …rst two terms on its right hand side, i.e., the …rst and second row, are induced by the selfselection constraints; these components would vanish in a …rst best environment where 9 See also Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) , and Gahvari (2014).
individual skill is observable, in which case = = 0. In a second-best optimum where individual skill is private information, at most one of these two self-selection constraints will be binding (as mentioned before). If the self-selection constraint given in equation (21), i.e., the constraint associated with the income-replication strategy, is binding ( > 0), the …rst term on the right hand side of equation (29) can either be positive or negative. This is interesting in itself: in a standard optimal income tax model with competitive labor markets, the corresponding term would be unambiguously positive due to the assumption that the marginal rates of substitution satisfy the condition @M RS I;B =@w < 0. 10 In the standard model, normality of consumption is a su¢ cient condition to guarantee that the single-crossing condition holds. In our setting, however, this is not enough. When comparing a low-skilled individual with a high-skilled mimicker adopting the income-replication strategy, it is still true that a high-skilled individual needs fewer hours to earn the same before-tax income as a low-skilled individual (since w h > w`). At the same time, however, a high-skilled individual employed in the highdemanding job exerts more e¤ort than a low-skilled individual in the low-demanding job. Therefore, if we were to make the reasonable assumption that @M RS Instead, if the self-selection constraint given in equation (22), i.e., the constraint associated with the job-replication strategy is binding ( > 0), the second row of eq. (29) will be unambiguously positive under the plausible assumption that @M RS j I;B =@e j > 0, thus contributing to a higher marginal income tax rate for the low-skilled. The reason is that a low-skilled individual exerts a positive level of e¤ort, whereas a high-skilled 1 0 This is typically referred to as the Agent-Monotonicity condition. See Seade (1982) . 1 1 The intuition behind the assumption @M RS j I;B =@e j > 0 is that increased on-the-job e¤ort makes leisure outside the workplace more valuable at the margin, ceteris paribus (i.e. for given values of I, B and w).
mimicker adopting the job-replication strategy exerts no e¤ort at all, implying that a low-skilled individual attaches a higher marginal value to leisure outside the workplace compared to a mimicker (despite that they are paid the same wage rate, w`). An increase in the marginal income tax rate, which induces the low-skilled to reduce their hours of work, will thus hurt the mimicker more than it hurts the low-skilled, meaning that this policy opens up for more redistribution through a relaxation of the job-replication self-selection constraint. 12 The third and fourth rows of equation (29) arise as a consequence of e¢ ciency wage setting for the low-skilled type and would vanish if the labor market were competitive.
Note that the choice of income-consumption bundle for the low-skilled, (I`; B`), a¤ects the labor market outcome via two channels: (i) the hourly wage rates, w`and w h , and
(ii) the number of low-skilled workers that each …rm …nds it optimal to hire. Starting with the marginal tax response to an induced change in the hourly wage rate paid to the low-skilled, w`, note …rst that
in which we have used that the indirect e¤ects of w`, arising via the individuals'labor supply and e¤ort choices, vanish as a consequence of optimality, i.e., by the Envelope Theorem. @EV`=@w`is interpretable as a direct expected bene…t faced by each individual of the low-skilled type following an increase in their wage rate. If the self-selection constraint associated with the job-replication strategy, i.e., equation (22), is binding, such a wage increase would also make mimicking more attractive, which explains the …rst term in square brackets in the third row. 13 We can then interpret the di¤erence in square brackets in the third row of equation (29) as re ‡ecting the net social cost of 1 2 In the alternative -albeit less plausible -scenario where @M RS j I;B =@e j < 0, the second row of equation (29) will, instead, be negative and contributes to a lower marginal tax rate for the low-skilled. 1 3 We have an increase in w`; if this di¤erence is positive (negative), an increase in w`would lead to lower (higher) welfare, ceteris paribus. To see what this net social cost implies for the marginal income tax rate faced by the low-skilled, suppose …rst that dw`=dI`> 0, meaning that a combined increase in the before-tax and disposable income for the lowskilled would push up their hourly wage rate. 14 In this case, there will be an incentive for the government to increase (reduce) the labor supply of the low-skilled via a lower (higher) marginal tax rate if
@v B`; Iẁ`; e = 0
The policy incentives are analogous in the alternative scenario where dw`=dI`< 0, in which case the government would implement a lower (higher) marginal tax rate for the low-skilled if the sign of (30) is positive (negative). 15 A direct employment e¤ect of marginal taxation is captured by the …rst term in the forth row of equation (29), showing how a compensated (for low-skilled agents) increase in I`a¤ects N`. Notice …rst that the sign of e N`;I`i s in principle ambiguous. For interpretational purposes, we will focus on the case where dÑ`=dI`< 0 (as shown in the Appendix C, equation (C12), a su¢ cient condition for dÑ`=dI`< 0 is that 1 16 ).
In this case, the government has an incentive to distort the labor supply of low-skilled workers downwards through higher marginal taxation for two reasons: …rst, when the 1 4 Since we have established that dw h =dI`< 0, it also follows that a compensated (for the lowskilled) marginal increase in I`leads to an increase in w`=e`. Even though an increase in w`=e`does not necessarily imply that w`increases, for interpretational purposes we here focus on the case when dw`=dI`> 0. 1 5 Recall that @ 2 v=@e@L < 0 by assumption. Therefore, the sign of (30) is more likely to be positive the lower the e¤ort level, e`, the higher the unemployment rate, u, and the higher the value of the Lagrange multiplier . 1 6 This condition is, for instance, satis…ed under under a Cobb-Douglas production function where = 1. In this case, we can use equation (C12) to derive dÑ`=dI`= N`=I`.
transfer paid to the unemployed is larger than the transfer paid to the employed lowskilled workers (I` B`+ b > 0), an increase in N`will increase the net tax revenue;
second, an increase in N`leads to a lower unemployment rate, which is socially bene…cial when the social value of decreased unemployment measured in terms of public funds, = , is positive. 17 Finally, the second term on the fourth row of equation (29) re ‡ects an interaction e¤ect between the labor supply of the low-skilled and the tax revenue the government can collect from the high-skilled. We show in the Appendix C that d e w h =dI`< 0 (see equation (C13)). Therefore, this component also pushes in the direction of increasing the marginal income tax rate implemented for the low-skilled. The interpretation is that the wage rate paid to the high-skilled increases in response to a compensated (for low-skilled workers) marginal reduction in I`. In turn, this opens up the possibility to raise additional tax revenue from the high-skilled without violating the minimum utility restriction.
We will now turn to the factors determining the social value of decreased unemployment, = . For this purpose, let
denote the marginal rate of substitution between the unemployment rate and the unemployment bene…t for a low-skilled individual, 18 and de…ne the "utility compensated" 1 7 A similar employment-related motive for tax policy intervention was found by Sjögren (2003, 2004) , based on di¤erent models with trade-unionized labor markets. wage and employment responses to an increase in the unemployment rate such that
Proposition 2 gives an expression for the social value of decreased unemployment at a second-best optimum. Pirttilä and Tuomala, 1997). As shown by Sandmo (1980) , stability requires that the feedback e¤ect is positive. We will, therefore, base our discussion of the result in Proposition 2 on the assumption that > 0 . In our case, where we have used the social …rst order conditions for u and b to derive equation (35), it follows that the feedback e¤ect depends on how the number of employed persons of the low-skilled type is in ‡uenced both by the unemployment rate and the unemployment bene…t. The term dÑ`=du in the expression for can be thought of as the employment response to a utility compen-sated increase in the unemployment rate, where the compensation is measured in terms of the unemployment bene…t.
We can interpret `u M RSù ;b in the …rst row of equation (35) as the sum of the marginal willingness to pay to avoid unemployment among the unemployed, where `u represents the number of unemployed persons. This component thus resembles the sum of the marginal willingness to pay to avoid a public bad, with the modi…cation that it is only measured over the relevant part of the population.
The remaining two terms in the …rst row of equation (35) are interpretable as public revenue e¤ects. A direct public revenue e¤ect of a variation in the unemployment rate is captured by the second term in curly brackets, which re ‡ects that the net tax revenue increases by I` B`+ b = T (I`) + b when a low-skilled individual switches from unemployment to employment. The increased tax revenue is, in turn, multiplied by e N`;1 u , measuring the extent to which each …rm's demand for low-skilled workers is a¤ected by a change in the economy-wide unemployment rate. By using equations
we can see that the sign of the compensated response of N`to a marginal increase in u depends both on the elasticity of substitution between the labor inputs, and on how the e¤ort exerted by the low-skilled changes in response to a compensated increase in u. Therefore, this public revenue e¤ect vanishes in the special case where = 1, in which d e N`=du = 0. Instead, if > 1 and @e e`=@u < 0 (or < 1 and @e e`=@u > 0), we have d e N`=du < 0, which implies that public revenue considerations lead to an increase in = .
The third term in curly brackets in the …rst row of equation (35) captures another public revenue e¤ect, descending from the fact that a variation in the unemployment rate among the low-skilled a¤ects the equilibrium wage rate paid in the high-demanding job. Using equations (18)- (19), we can see that the sign of this e¤ect depends on the sign of
Therefore, if @e e`=@u > 0, an increase in the unemployment rate will lead to an increase in the wage rate paid to the high-skilled. In turn, this opens up for the possibility of raising additional tax revenue from the high-skilled without violating the minimum utility restriction. As a consequence, the …nal term in curly brackets is negative and contributes to a downwards adjustment of = . Instead, if @e e`=@u < 0, an increase in the unemployment rate leads to lower w h , which would require a lower tax payment by the high-skilled to leave their utility unchanged. In the latter case, the …nal term in curly brackets is positive and contributes to an upward adjustment of = .
The self-selection constraints directly a¤ect the social value of decreased unemployment through the second row of equation (35). The …rst term captures the e¤ect of a variation in w h , induced by a change in the unemployment rate, on the self-selection constraint associated with the income-replication strategy. If d e w h =du > (<) 0, an increase in the unemployment rate makes this mimicking strategy more (less) attractive which, in turn, contributes to raising (lowering) the social value of decreased unemployment.
Finally, the second term appears because an increase in the unemployment rate a¤ects the wage rate paid in the low-demanding job, which leads to an additional social cost or bene…t for reasons similar to those illustrated when discussing (29). In particular, dw`=du can be thought of as a utility compensated wage response to an increase in the unemployment rate, where the compensation appears in the form of an increase in the unemployment bene…t, while
is interpretable as the net social cost of an increase in the wage paid to the low-skilled type (as explained above in the context of marginal income tax policy). Therefore, if the product between d e w h =du and (36) is positive, the social value of decreased unemployment will be larger than implied by the remaining terms on the right hand side of equation (35). The intuition is, in this case, that reduced unemployment would also imply an indirect welfare bene…t through an e¤ect on the wage rate paid in the lowdemanding job. The opposite policy incentive arises if the product between dw`=du and the bracketed term in the second row is negative.
To complete the characterization of the optimal second-best policy, we will now turn to the policy rule for the unemployment bene…t. For this purpose, let
denote the marginal rate of substitution between the unemployment bene…t and the disposable income in the employed state for a low-skilled individual, and de…ne the "utility compensated" wage and employment responses to an increase in the unemployment bene…t, b, such that
Proposition 3 characterizes the e¢ cient level of the unemployment bene…t at a secondbest optimum.
Proposition 3. The optimal unemployment bene…t abides by the following policy rule: Proof: see the Appendix E.
The left hand side of equation (40) is interpretable as the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for a higher unemployment bene…t, measured among the employed individuals of the low-skilled type. In particular, M RSb ;B re ‡ects the amount of income that each low-skilled individual would be willing to forego, when employed, in order to marginally raise his/her consumption in the event of becoming unemployed.
Thus, (1 u) `M RSb ;B can be interpreted as measuring the aggregate insurance bene…t for the low-skilled of a marginal increase in the consumption available if becoming unemployed. 19 Turning to the right hand side, the direct public budget cost of a marginal increase in b (which is paid to the u `w orkers being unemployed) is measured by the …rst term, while the second and third terms are employment and public revenue e¤ects reminiscent of those described in the context of Proposition 1. More speci…cally, the second term in the …rst row captures the net social gain of the employment e¤ect induced by a compensated marginal increase in b. By using equations (15) and (19), we can rewrite equation (37) to read
From our discussion in subsection 2.1, we know that @e`=@b < 0 and that @ 2 v= @e`@B` 0 is a su¢ cient condition for @e`=@B`> 0. As long as > 1, we would thus expect dÑ`=db < 0. Therefore, if I` B`+ b + = `> 0 (< 0), the employment e¤ects of a compensated increase in b calls for an upward (a downward) adjustment in the net resource cost of raising the unemployment bene…t. This typically contributes to decrease (increase) the unemployment bene…t, ceteris paribus. Similarly, the third term in the …rst row captures a public budget e¤ect descending from the fact that a variation in the unemployment bene…t a¤ects the wage rate facing the workers in the high-demanding job. Using equations (17)- (19) and (39), we can derive
implying that sign d e w h =db = sign @e e`=@b . Therefore, if @e e`=@b < 0 (which is plausible based on the arguments presented above), an increase in the unemployment bene…t reduces the before-tax wage rate faced by the high-skilled. In turn, a lower wage necessitates a lower income tax payment by the high-skilled in order to leave their utility unchanged. This indirect public budget e¤ect leads to an increase in the net marginal cost of raising the unemployment bene…t.
The second row of equation (40), and the …rst term in the third row, re ‡ect that a compensated marginal increase in b (an increase in b accompanied by a utility compensated upward adjustment in T I` ) contributes to relax the self-selection constraint.
First, since low-skilled workers face the risk of becoming unemployed whereas a potential mimicker does not, a compensated (for low-skilled agents) increase in the unemployment bene…t makes mimicking less attractive, irrespective of which strategy the mimicker chooses. This e¤ect is summarized by the second row of equation (40), where the …rst term is negative under the income-replication strategy ( > 0 and = 0), while the second term is negative under the job-replication strategy ( = 0 and > 0).
Intuitively, the transfer paid to the unemployed is an instrument better targeted to the low-skilled than a transfer to low-income earners in general. This e¤ect works to reduce the net resource cost of making the unemployment bene…t more generous. Second, the …rst term in the third row captures the e¤ect of an induced change in w h on the utility of a high-skilled mimicker adopting the income-replication strategy. As we have argued above, the most likely case is where d e w h =db < 0, implying that a marginal increase in b has the further advantage of lowering the utility of a mimicker using the incomereplication strategy. This component also contributes to reduce the net resource cost of making the unemployment bene…t more generous.
The …nal term in the third row of equation (40) captures the net social cost of a change in w`induced by a compensated marginal increase in b. In general, this component can be either positive or negative. To go further, we use equations (16)- (19) and (38) to calculate an expression for d e w`=db as follows:
With @ 2 e`=@L`@L`< 0, we have
Since the most plausible case is the one where @ 2 e`=@L`@B`> 0, @ 2 e`=@L`@b < 0; and @e e`=@b < 0, one would expect that d e w`=db > 0. Thus, if a compensated increase in b induces the …rms to raise the wage rate paid to the low-skilled workers, a bene…t (in terms of higher utility due to reduced work hours) would accrue both to employed low-skilled agents and to high-skilled mimickers choosing the job-replication strategy.
When the former (latter) e¤ect dominates, such that
the wage response to a compensated marginal increase in b is socially bene…cial (detrimental), thus lowering (raising) the net resource cost of making the unemployment bene…t more generous.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has integrated e¢ ciency wage setting in the theory of optimal redistributive income taxation. In doing so, we used a model with two skill-types, where e¢ ciency wage setting characterizes the labor market faced by the low-skilled, while the highskilled face a conventional, competitive labor market. Furthermore, there are two types of jobs in this economy; a low-demanding job which can be carried out by all individuals, and a high-demanding job which can only be carried out by the high-skilled. The highdemanding job requires maximum e¤ort per hour spent at the workplace, whereas e¤ort per work hour is a decision-variable for individuals employed in the low-demanding job, such that individuals employed in this type of job have the option to "shirk" with an exogenous probability of detection. The government uses a nonlinear income tax and an unemployment bene…t to redistribute income from the high-skilled to the low-skilled and to correct for imperfect competition in the labor market. As such, the government must also recognize that a high-skilled individual has two di¤erent options of mimicking the income of the low-skilled type; either by reducing the hours of work when employed in a high-demanding job (referred to as the income-replication strategy) or by choosing a low-demanding job (referred to as the job-replication strategy).
We would like to emphasize …ve results. First, the marginal income tax rate implemented for the high-skilled is likely to be negative. Albeit reminiscent of a result derived by Stiglitz (1982) , the underlying mechanism is fundamentally di¤erent here: the negative marginal income tax rate implemented for the high-skilled provides a mechanism for increasing the demand for low-skilled labor. As such, it contributes to increase the net tax revenue and reduce the unemployment rate; both of which are socially desirable under plausible assumptions.
Second, the marginal income tax rate implemented for the low-skilled is not necessarily positive (as it would be in a standard model with competitive labor markets and no extensive margin of labor supply). 20 Although employment-related motives behind the tax policy (i.e., the incentive to increase the employment among the low-skilled)
are likely to push up this marginal income tax rate, its sign may also depend on which of the two self-selection constraints that is binding. Whereas the self-selection constraint designed to prevent the job-replication strategy typically works to increase the marginal income tax rate of the low-skilled, the qualitative e¤ect of the self-selection constraint designed to prevent the income-replication strategy is ambiguous. The intuition is that, although the income-replication strategy allows the high-skilled individual to spend more time on leisure than the low-skilled, a high-skilled mimicker employed in the high-demanding job still exerts more e¤ort per work hour than the mimicked, low-skilled individual under the income-replication strategy.
Third, the social value of decreased unemployment takes a form reminiscent of shadow prices of public bads in the sense of depending on (i) the sum of the marginal willingness to pay to avoid unemployment among the unemployed, (ii) e¤ects induced by the self-selection constraint, and (iii) tax revenue e¤ects created by varying the unemployment rate. Note also that the social value of decreased unemployment directly a¤ects the marginal income tax rates facing both skill-types at the second-best optimum, 2 0 The result that the optimal marginal tax rate faced by low-skilled workers is not necessarily positive when …rms pay e¢ ciency wages in the low-demanding job is reminiscent of a similar …nding obtained in a recent contribution by da Costa and Maestri (2017). By modifying the canonical Mirrleesian model to accommodate the assumption that …rms have market power in the labor market, they show that almost all workers face negative marginal tax rates.
despite that unemployment may only arise among the low-skilled in our model.
Fourth, an increase in the unemployment bene…t typically leads to a relaxation of the relevant self-selection constraint, irrespective of whether potential mimickers adopt an income-replication or job-replication strategy. As such, an increase in the unemployment bene…t serves as a device to relax this constraint, which contributes to reduce the social resource cost of the unemployment bene…t.
Fifth, the sign of the tax revenue e¤ects in ‡uencing the social value of decreased unemployment and the optimal unemployment bene…t, respectively, crucially depend on the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent types of labor inputs (in particular, whether the elasticity of substitution is larger or smaller than one). It also depends on the direction of the e¤ort response by low-skilled individuals to a compensated variation in the unemployment rate and the unemployment bene…t, respectively. (15)- (19): Totally di¤erentiating the systems of equations (12)- (14) gives, in matrix terms 2
Iẁ`e`F 00 
Iẁ`N`F 00 11 dIẁ`N`e`F 00 11 
Starting with the comparative statics with respect to I`, we have 2
By exploiting the assumption that the F -function is linearly homogeneous, the determinant of the 3x3 matrix on the left hand side is equal to (L`)
F 00 11 . We can then derive
In the derivation of equation (A4), we have exploited the fact that F 00 11 = N h L h F 00 12 = e`N`L` due to the assumption that the production function is linearly homogeneous.
Proceeding in a similar way, the comparative statics results with respect to B`are obtained by solving the system 2
The comparative statics results with respect to the remaining control variables in the social decision-problem, i.e., I h , B h , u, and b are obtained starting from the system (A1) and following a similar procedure.
Appendix B
First order conditions of the social decision-problem: The …rst order conditions with respect to I h , B h , I`, B`, u, and b can be written as
we can simplify (B3)-(B4) and rewrite them to read
By noting that
and substitute h M RS h I;B L h for ( + + )
. We can then rewrite equations (C3) and (C4) as follows:
Dividing (C5) by (C6) and multiplying by the right hand side of (C6) gives the following expression: 
